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 Considers the governance of natural gas networks in emerging cities.
 Adopts a geographical approach looking at interactions between natural gas infrastructure and urban space.
 Switch to natural gas linked to ﬁnancial purpose (subsidy cuts) more than concern for climate change.
 Switch to natural gas shaped by policies governing other urban energy forms.
 Urban politics and issues of affordability impact the governance of natural gas transition.
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a b s t r a c t
Recent scholarship on urban energy governance has focused on low carbon energy strategies seen as a
response to climate change and energy pressure threats. But such approaches tend to overlook the
situations of cities from the Global South and emerging countries concerned with strong energy demand
growth. The development of urban natural gas networks is an understudied response to such a
challenge. Focusing on three cities, Istanbul, Cairo and Sfax (Tunisia), the article analyses the factors
and the governance of these energy transitions. It uses a geographical approach to such processes that
highlight the mutual inﬂuence of the territory in its material and political dimensions and of the policy
goals and tools in the implementation. The development of urban gas networks rests upon the proximity
of gas deposits. It is determined by metropolitan strategies for economic development as well as by
programs aiming to cut energy subsidies. Though urban gas networks have a strong potential for
restructuring the physical and social landscapes in cities, the dominant commercial approach taken by
energy utilities and morphological constraints in the urban fabric limit their universalization. Natural gas
is part of a mix of energies at the urban level and often competes with other energy forms, speciﬁcally
renewables (like solar water heaters). Lastly, the development of urban natural gas networks sparks
heated politics in relation to unfulﬁlled energy demand and affordability.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In the context of climate change, cities are seen by numerous
observers and actors at the international, national or local level as
key institutions and places in order to design and implement
energy transition strategies aiming to promote low carbon energy
policies. Available academic works on these issues analyze the
determinants and the tools of such policies. They highlight the
possibilities opened by new technologies, the advent of alternative
sources of energy and political changes that enable urban actors,
with various degrees of success, to gain agency to deal with the
nexus city/climate change and, hence, energy (Hodson and
Marvin, 2010; Coutard and Rutherford, 2010; H. Bulkeley et al.,
2010; H.A. Bulkeley et al., 2010). The available scholarship tends to
focus largely on northern and large cities, where such energy
transitions begin to materialise. Several academics contend that
further studies are needed to understand energy issues and
prospects for change in cities from the Global South (Hodson
and Marvin, 2010; H. Bulkeley et al., 2010; H.A. Bulkeley et al.,
2010). Recent scholarship underscore that such cities follow very
different paths compared to what is observed in the North.
Speciﬁcally, because climate change does not seem to be the
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priority there, low carbon technologies are not the main focus of
energy policies in such cities and issues of access, shortages and
affordability dominate the agendas (Jaglin and Verdeil, 2013).
The literature on energy transition has well documented the
electriﬁcation of rural areas and its governance (for instance: Davis
(1998), Heuraux (2010), Murphy (2001), Rehman et al. (2010)).
But until recently, apart a few studies, urban energy transitions in
developing and emerging countries have remained overlooked by
research, though one can assume that the classic scenarios, as well
documented by historians (Smil, 2010), do play out – and not the
quest for low carbon energy. They imply a move away from so-
called traditional forms of energy (notably biomass and its by-
products such as charcoal) towards modern types of energy
(electricity, liqueﬁed petroleum gas [LPG] in cylinders, petrol for
automobiles) as well as different types of so-called transition
energies (kerosene, diesel, fossil coal, etc.) (Barnes et al., 2005).
Urbanization is a driving factor in these transitions too, although
other factors such as income level, the kinds of resources available
nearby and public (ﬁscal, rate or infrastructure) policies also play a
role and make the path to such transitions substantially more
complex. Energy transition is not deﬁned only by shifts in the fuel
mix but also by customers' practices and urban change. Among
these, electriﬁcation and electricity issues in ordinary cities of the
Global South are the topics that have attracted most of the interest
(for instance: (McDonald, 2008; Jaglin, 2014; Verdeil, 2014b;
Silver, 2013b).
Other urban energy technologies remain under documented,
notably natural gas supplied through networks. There have been a
few studies analyzing the rise of this energy form in several cities
in emerging countries like Brazil (Kamimura et al., 2006), Turkey
(Özcan et al., 2013) and above all, China (Chen et al., 2013, 2014;
Yu et al., 2014). Substituting natural gas to coal appears as a good
way to reduce energy consumption and cost, as well as green-
house gas emissions. At the local level, developing natural gas
network also takes part in mitigating pollution policies, which is a
major concern in China (Mao et al., 2005). But these studies that
mostly stem from economics or energy technology fail to address
“the interaction between urban change and the transformation of
energy systems – urban energy transition in short” (Rutherford
and Coutard, 2014). This article claims to analyze the transition to
urban natural gas networks from a geographical point of view, by
analyzing three Mediterranean metropolises where urban natural
gas networks have been built in the past 20 years: Istanbul in
Turkey, Cairo in Egypt and Sfax in Tunisia. It shows how the urban
social and political contexts and local dynamics shape the dis-
tinctive features of these energy transitions. Therefore, energy
governance has to ﬁnd ways to integrate urban actors and their
interests, though it is difﬁcult to identify convergent character-
istics given the inherent diversity of local situations.
2. Materials and analytical framework
Before presenting the materials used in the study, this section
displays the analytical framework elaborated to compare the ways
though which energy issues and speciﬁcally the development of
natural gas networks have become urban issues in the three cities
studied, and the energy governance it entails. To do so, this
framework connects energy issues and spatiality. A recent synth-
esis has applied a series of geographical concepts that allow us to
grasp “how energy transitions are spatially-constituted” (Bridge
et al., 2013, 339). Though this study was meant for understanding
low carbon energy transition, it provides a framework that can be
easily applied to other energy changes. The relevant concepts for
the purpose of this article are location, territoriality, spatial
differentiation, uneven development and spatial embeddedness.
It is also necessary to look at the contributions made by other
scholars at the crossroads of environmental studies, socio-
technical studies and urban studies. Their research discusses the
governance of climate change and energy policies and emphasizes
the need to think about the political dimensions and power
relations between social groups and actors within the analyses
of energy transition (Hodson and Marvin, 2010; H.A. Bulkeley et
al., 2010). This approach is best expressed by Rutherford and
Coutard's recent call for “studying the co-production of energy
systems in transition and systemic urban change, the contested
and political processes involved and their uneven socio-spatial
outcomes across diverse global urban contexts” (Rutherford and
Coutard, 2014, 1359). Recently, the emphasis on energy justice has
reﬁned the framework for analyzing the socially differentiated
participation in such processes and their uneven outputs
(Bickerstaff et al., 2013). This article analyses the implementation
of gas networks in the three cities according to ﬁve entry points
which are deﬁned by combining the issues and related analytic
criteria underscored in this research.
(a) The ﬁrst focuses on location, understood as relational proxi-
mity, which notably allows one to identify one element of an
energy system in relation to the others: e.g., the city as a
consumption hub in terms of energy resources or transport
channels for such energy (Bridge et al., 2013). Energy transi-
tion strategies depend upon new pressures on resources and
energy supply – in other words, in our study, access to gas
resources. This implies analyzing the proximity of deposits and
gas pipelines. The discovery and extraction of new Mediterra-
nean gas deposits over the past 20 years and the geopolitics of
pipelines between Asia and Europe thus have modiﬁed cities'
access to this energy source.
(b) The second point is the connection between energy transitions
and the metropolitan project as deﬁned and advanced by
metropolitan coalitions of elites. This analysis refers to the
concept of territoriality (Bridge et al., 2013) e.g. “how social
and political powers are organized and exercised over space”.
It is therefore needed to identify the political projects (and
their initiators) associated with such technological changes
(in our study, the supply of gas). In their work, Hodson and
Marvin (2010) argue that urban energy policies are part of a
broader set of strategies connected to both increased pressure
on resources and, thus, to a need to secure cities' supplies, but
also to a reshaping of the respective roles of States and world
cities in neo-liberal economies. The latter have a direct interest
in implementing new policies – including energy transition –
in order to secure their economic footing and, thus, improve
their productivity and diversify their markets. Therefore, it is
necessary to identify the actors that create new interest
groups at the urban level (which unite the entrepreneurial
classes and political-administrative elites), as well as their
visions of the future and how the development of urban gas
networks is becoming a part of them.
(c) The third point of the analysis focuses on the connections
between the implementation of gas networks and urban
reconﬁguration in terms of both urban materiality and urban
cohesion. This involves analyzing the networks' spatial exten-
sion in each city, users' access to the service and the uses that
form around these networks. Through these criteria, the
research addresses the universalization of service in each city
and the barriers to it. This raises the issue of energy justice, as
the result of both spatial differentiation and unequal develop-
ment (to use Bridge et al.'s (2013) concepts), combined
with the claims made by some stakeholders against the
results of these policies in the name of fairness (Eames and
Hunt, 2013, 48).
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(d) The fourth point analyses the articulation between the devel-
opment of gas networks and other energy measures and
policies in terms of competition versus complementarity. The
analysis refers here to the notion of “spatial embeddedness
and path dependency” (as connected to energy issues by
Bridge et al. (2013)), that is, to the slowing effects that past
infrastructure investments and “place-based cultures of con-
sumption” (p.338) can have on energy transitions. This
involves thinking about the connections between the new
energy service (the gas network) and the existing set-up in
material as well as social, economic and cultural terms (the
previously used energy resources and services, like bottled
gas, charcoal or solar water heaters that are implemented
during the same period as natural gas networks). It further
means thinking about transitions as experienced at different
speeds, and about relationships between different energy
types and services which are not limited to succession/sub-
stitution but also involve co-existence, which implies compe-
tition as well as complementarity.
(e) The ﬁnal point in the analysis focuses on the politics of energy
transitions and more speciﬁcally on conﬂict and opposition to
measures deﬁning access to and the use of gas. The research
draws here from studies that addressed the need to take into
account reactions to and ways in which new technologies have
been appropriated by city dwellers, users or builders. Indeed,
their ability to protest against or circumvent energy transition
policy measures thanks to unexpected practices or material
disruption can be the causes of uncertainty or of unforeseen
changes (Castán Broto and Bulkeley, 2013; H. Bulkeley et al.,
2010; Cupples, 2011). Just like problems related to deﬁning
instruments and setting measures for new technological facil-
ities (e.g., subsidies or ﬁscal incentives), it may lead to results
different from those initially anticipated. In this sense, energy
transitions must be seen as “unruly”. To what extent can these
observations be applied to the customers' reactions to the
implementation of natural gas networks?
The following section draw on the results obtained three long-
term ﬁeldwork surveys in the different cities, coupled with shorter
stays. For two of the cases, ﬁeldwork was conducted over a
4-month period; for the third case (Cairo), ﬁeldwork lasted a year.
The research draws on three types of sources: an in-depth look at
the technical literature, notably from network operators, as well as
available cartographical and statistical data; the media, particu-
larly the available press reviews; and interviews conducted with
public administration staff and operators (on average 20 inter-
views in each city) as well as with inhabitants during ﬁeldwork
visits (10–20 small qualitative semi-structured interviews per city,
focusing on access, technical difﬁculties, quality of service, afford-
ability issues). The operation on the ﬁeldwork was globally
structured according to the following analytical framework.1
3. Results: the development of gas networks in Cairo, Istanbul
and Sfax
3.1. Contextualizing Cairo, Istanbul and Sfax: emerging and energy-
dependent cities
Before analyzing the results, this section provides some general
features about the three case cities, which differ in size but
nonetheless share the characteristics of emerging cities. Four
factors deﬁne emerging economies: being in a middle-income
country; having a “catch-up” economic impetus resulting in a GDP
growth rate that is clearly superior to old industrialized countries;
institutional and structural economic changes embodied by direct
foreign investment in industry and services, and an increase in
trade; and ﬁnally strong growth potential (compared to advanced
economy countries) (Vercueil, 2011). Table 1 – which lists coun-
tries since data for the cities themselves are not available –
conﬁrms these criteria.
If we look at cities more speciﬁcally, the emerging metropolis
has other additional characteristics worth taking into account
(Lorrain, 2014).
According to Table 2, their demographic growth is striking.
Combined with the recent decoupling between demographic
growth and (even more rapid) spatial expansion, it has led to
the rise of immense and contrasted agglomerations. Istanbul
experienced booming growth between the 1960s and 1980s; this
rate has now slowed somewhat but has nonetheless resulted in
more than a doubling of the city in the past 30 years in a perimeter
that is constantly being redeﬁned. Cairo has experienced equally
strong growth. Its density has remained relatively high, but since
2000, the urban perimeter has tripled with the construction of
huge gated communities in the desert. Sfax, Tunisia's second
largest city, has also experienced strong growth (in the context
of a more marked slow-down in demographic growth in Tunisia).
There are very stark differences in the standard of living and
lifestyle of these quickly expanding populations. The prevalence of
informal or unregulated urbanization is very strong and under-
scores how hard it can be to ﬁnd decent housing. This is a product
of massive poverty but also of problems regulating real-estate
markets.2 In Cairo, it is estimated that 62% of households lived in
informal zones in 2006 (Sims, 2010); in Istanbul, this involved 60%
of households in 2008 (Pérouse, 2010, 251), but this percentage
declined signiﬁcantly following government changes to housing
policy; in Sfax, informal settlements represented at least 40% of
housing in 2003 (Bennasr, 2003). This situation is often aggravated
by limited access to essential urban services (notably water, waste
facilities, transportation and energy). However, regularization
policies are much more integrative with respect to urban infra-
structure in Tunisia than in Egypt (Chabbi, 2012; Sims, 2010).
Despite this social inequality and unequal access to network
services more particularly, the three cities have all experienced a
strong rise in the demand for energy (Özcan et al., 2013; Brand and
Zingerle, 2011; Suding, 2011). Between 2001 and 2011, at the
Table 1
Country development indicators.
Source: World Bank, UN Data
Country Income
per
capita
(PPP) ($)
Income
group
Annual GDP
growth (ave.
1990–2011)
(%)
Foreign direct
investment
(2010) (M US
$)
KWh
per
capita
2011
KWh
per
capita
2001
Egypt 6723 Lower-
middle
income
2.8 6711 1743 1074
Turkey 18,348 Upper-
middle
income
2.4 9036 2709 1615
Tunisia 9795 Upper-
middle
income
3.3 1334 1297 1048
1 For more detailed information, refer to the Master's theses, available online,
that provide a ﬁrst analysis of the gathered data (Arik, 2011; Bolzon, 2012;
Markoum, 2011).
2 Informality is obviously deﬁned differently in each legal context, but the
shared common denominator is the construction of housing outside of ofﬁcial
procedural channels at the time of construction.
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national level, per capita power consumption increased, this
increase reaching 23%, 62% and 68% in Tunisia and Egypt and
Turkey respectively.3 This reﬂects progress made in electrical
distribution and an increase in new household-appliances use
(e.g., TV, refrigerators, etc.), particularly amongst working and
middle class populations. Other uses such as the steep increase in
air-conditioning use (hot and cold) are signs that new practices
and representations of physical comfort are spreading. Overall,
these urban centers are experiencing major changes in their
energy systems (Verdeil, 2014b), among which the development
of a gas network is one under studied component.
Another important point to consider is the institutional situa-
tion in these emerging cities. All of the cities are, to varying
degrees, under State control. Nowhere is this stronger than in
Egypt where there are no municipal institutions. The way jurisdic-
tion has been divided in the other two cities means that municipal
institutions have limited or even very weak power in Turkey and
Tunisia (Massicard and Bayraktar, 2012; Turki and Verdeil, 2014).
Moreover, as in many emerging cities (Lorrain, 2014) urban growth
has made institutional unity impossible: Cairo has three distinct
governorates, and the agglomeration of Sfax is comprised of
7 municipalities. Only in Istanbul can one observe the emergence
of a single metropolitan authority, which is nonetheless heavily
controlled by the State (Pérouse, 2010). However, in Cairo and
Istanbul, urban services like water, electricity or transportation are
managed by metropolitan or regional utilities or administrations,
while it is the case in Sfax only for transportation.
In terms of their economies, the three metropolises are very
industrialized. Istanbul and Cairo are their country's main indus-
trial production hub, although both are facing industrial dispersion
and a shift towards specialization in services (Denis and Vignal,
2002; Pérouse, 2010). As for Sfax, it is the largest industrial city in
the country (Bennasr, 2005). In all three cases, this industrializa-
tion is tied not only to local markets, but is also directly connected
to each country's involvement in the globalization of trade.
3.2. Energy diversiﬁcation and the accessibility of gas resources
The extremely rapid increase in demand for energy mentioned
above has occurred alongside the soaring prices (particularly in
the past 15 years) of international hydrocarbon – especially oil-
products. This has created a desire to diversify energy sources,
which has in turn cashed-in on recent developments in the
exploitation of natural gas. Indeed, the implementation of gas
networks in the three cities would never have been fathomable or
possible without a turn towards gas in energy policies. This turn
can be explained by the exploitation of newly discovered natural
gas deposits in the surrounding environment and/or the passage
of a gas pipeline across the country transporting gas towards other
markets, both of them leading to the emergence of uses for natural
gas (industrial and electric, as well as domestic), starting in the
1980s.
Egypt is ranked third in Africa in terms of its known gas
reserves. These reserves have mostly been exploited since the
1980s, notably for electricity production, industrial use and, more
recently, for residential consumption and as automobile fuel.
Although some of the gas is exported (notably to Israel, which
has further fueled controversy since the 2011 revolution), its local
use has also ﬂourished.
Tunisia also extracts natural gas from deposits in the south of
the country and off the coast near Sfax through State-owned
companies and, since the 2000s, multinational corporations.
An Algerian pipeline also crosses Tunisia on its way to Italy and
European markets (Fig. 1). Tunisia is allowed a free quota on the
amounts transported as a transit fare. This available gas has
spurred policy aimed at replacing oil with gas and its by-
products for electricity production, industry, residential use and,
more recently, transportation. In 2010, natural gas accounted for
53% of the primary energy consumed in the country.
The Turkish case is different since the country does not produce
natural gas. Turkey has, however, become a veritable energy hub,
with several gas pipelines from Central Asia, Russia, the Caucasus
and Iran transiting through the country since the late 1980s
(Chuvin, 2008). One of these pipelines crosses the Dardanelles
towards Greece and other projects are planned, notably the Trans
Anatolian destined more speciﬁcally for the exportation to Europe
of Azeri gas from the Caspian Sea. The troubled geopolitics
surrounding these projects makes them difﬁcult to follow, parti-
cularly given that the economic crisis has affected anticipated need
and, thus, their forecasted proﬁtability. Overall through, this has
not affected the important role played by Turkey in supplying
Europe. Alongside the transportation of gas to Europe, Turkey has
also diversiﬁed its gas use, notably for electricity, industry and in
the residential sector. Istanbul was one of the ﬁrst cities affected
by this.
The greater availability of gas is speciﬁc to a certain number of
countries and cities, and has encouraged a reshaping of broad
energy policies. But other factors are more inﬂuential.
3.3. Actors and justiﬁcations behind the implementation of urban
gas networks
Looking at the public policy contexts behind the launching of
gas networks and at the coalitions of actors that justify and impose
them is one way to identify the diversity of visions and how they
are connected to urban issues.
In Istanbul, the start of the gas network in 1986 corresponded
with a newfound availability of gas, when a pipeline from the
Soviet Union reached the city. But the main driver behind its
implementation was the massive air pollution in the city, whose
root cause was the widespread use of coal at the time (Arik,
2013). This pollution was the subject of intense local debate in
the early 1990s, but acceleration of the gas network's construc-
tion also hinged on two events in urban politics: the emergence
of the Islamist Refah party (now the AKP), which has dominated
Table 2
City development features.
City Population in 2010 Population in 1980 Density in 2010 (inhab./km²) Recent changes in density
Istanbul 12,800,000a (2008) 4,742,000a 2285a Urban sprawl encroaching on natural areas
Cairo 15,688,000b 7,652,000b 1307b Desert development with low density are twice as large as built up areas
Sfax 525,000b 301,680b 183b Very marked urban sprawl into surrounding agricultural areas
a DIE (Turkish Statistical Institute), in Pérouse (2010).
b e-Geopolis database 〈http://www.e-geopolis.eu/menapolis〉.
3 Source: World Bank. Again, city level ﬁgures are unavailable because energy
utilities' operating perimeters usually surpass urban borders. A strong national
increase therefore reﬂects not only urban changes but also rural electriﬁcation.
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local political life since the 1990s and, under its supervision,
a turn towards the internationalization of the metropolis
which resulted in an accelerated modernization of the city's
infrastructure and urban space. It was the municipality, domi-
nated by the Islamists, that was the main vector of this environ-
mental modernization of Istanbul, which was part of a larger
To Italy
Algeria
Lybia
Mediterranean Sea
Tunis and
agglomeration
Bizerte
Kairouan
Sousse - 
Monastir
Sfax
NabeulJendouba
Kasserine
Sidi Bouzid
Mahdia
Medenine
Gabe
Gafsa
400 000
1 000 000
300 000
100 000
Natural Gas Transportation Main
National Network
Transmed Pipe
Population of the main urban areas 
Areas supplied with natural gas 
(number of customers)
Sources : STEG, Situation du réseau
de gaz en Tunisie, 2011
INS, Population census 2004. 
Mapping: Hugo Bolzon, 2012. 
Done with Adobe Illustrator
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N
Fig. 1. Tunisia natural gas network and main supplied areas.
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modernization project. Two municipal agencies were set up and
played a key role in the gas project: IGDAŞ, the municipal gas
utility, and UGETAM,4 an international research centre IGDAS and
the municipality created in 1999 to adapt the technical norms to
the local market and train the staff. Neo-liberal reforms to the gas
market occurred only much later and did not play a role in the
construction of this market. It is also worth noting that based on
its pioneering experience the municipality of Istanbul has helped
spread the idea of using urban gas network technology to other
cities in the country.
In Cairo, the construction of urban gas networks was much less
tied to a desire to address a local public problem. It was rather part
of a national policy to curtail the amount of subsidies to the energy
sector in the context of structural adjustment in the late 1980s
(Markoum and Verdeil, 2013). In a context of rising oil prices and
severe ﬁscal crisis, the development of natural gas was presented
to Egyptian authorities by the World Bank as a source of budgetary
savings. Available locally, natural gas has indeed replaced imports,
particularly the LPG in cylinders widely used by city dwellers.
The government subsidized LPG at a rate of 90% of its real cost, as
Egyptians are very sensitive to price increases of this commodity
essential for cooking and heating, speciﬁcally in cities. The devel-
opment of urban gas was thus a national program created in
response to pressure from international donor agencies. Metropo-
litan actors were in no way involved in the project's elaboration,
whose implementation was then committed to Town Gas, the
afﬁliate of Egyptian Gas National Holding (EGAS), with no link
with local authorities. There is, however, a similarity between the
development of this network and the development of other urban
modernization programs which, like in Istanbul, have aimed to
improve the international image of the Egyptian capital, like waste
collection (Florin and Debout, 2011). But while the latter has been
delegated by the public authorities to private ﬁrms, this is not the
case for gas, which is not entrusted to the private sector but rather
to regional public utilities for the distribution of gas.
In Sfax, the main motivation behind the promotion of gas is
similar to the Egyptian case: it is driven by macro-economic
reasoning aiming at reducing energy subsidies, particularly for
imported LPG which is very sensitive to ﬂuctuations in interna-
tional prices. The development of a gas network for residential
households has been promoted in most large cities since the 1980s
and in Sfax since 2002. This policy was implemented by a national
State-owned company, the Société tunisienne d’électricité et de
gaz (STEG – the Tunisian Gas and Electricity Company). In contrast
to Istanbul, no local environmental or energy problem justiﬁes the
discourse of urban modernization. Local authorities, and particu-
larly the municipality, were in no way involved in this policy, nor
in any other infrastructure equipment policies (e.g., water, elec-
tricity), as these are the sole domain of the State and public sector
companies. And yet, the main target of authorities in the policy of
using natural gas as a substitution has always been industry
customers since they are the only ones that can guarantee a return
on the investments made. It was in this context that Sfax, the
country's largest industrial city, was a prime target as soon as the
new deposits in the Gulf of Gabes were exploited.
The justiﬁcations and governance underpinning the develop-
ment of natural gas in each city (and the actors involved) are thus
quite different. They are closely connected to the city and its
problems in the case of Istanbul, where the municipality is an
important actor. However, they are above all in the hands of the
State and World Bank in the Egyptian case and in the hands of the
State in the Tunisian case. In both the latter cases, the purely urban
dimensions are quite secondary. But, as we will see next, there is a
quite speciﬁc urban component to the ways in which these
networks have been rolled out and accessed by local populations.
3.4. The expansion of gas networks and the material and social
reshaping of the city
The development of networks and infrastructure for urban
services has historically been a vector for social integration,
particularly in Western cities. The universalization of networks
and the economies of scale they provide, combined with direct or
indirect public control (e.g., delegation of services, setting rates,
etc.), were, in the case of water, electricity and transportation,
a strong integration factor in the building of welfare states. And
yet, have the policies at work in the neo-liberal context of the past
20 years not altered the meaning behind the development of new
types of infrastructure such as natural gas networks in cities in
emerging countries? In the three cases studied, the inclusive
nature of the networks has been stiﬂed or even countered by, on
the one hand, the ﬁnancial conditions required to access them,
and, on the other hand, by the nature of urban morphology.
In Istanbul, there is a strong mindset of universalization. The
network's extension has been conducted in a very voluntary
manner by IGDAŞ, the municipal gas company. Over a 20 years
period, the network built 11,000 km of piping, and 97% of
urbanized territory in the metropolitan municipality is now
covered, supplying nearly 5 million residential customers (Fig. 2).
And yet, this universalization does not involve the sole use of gas;
many users still use coal for some purposes (notably in the soba,
the traditional heating stove). Some people do not use gas even
though their home is connected to the mains. Indeed, the cost of
equipping a home, as well as the price of the gas consumed, is not
at all subsidized. Such expenses weigh heavily on the budgets of
less wealthy households. Turkey's neo-liberal turn is reﬂected in
the IGDAŞ rate policy, which is based on full cost recovery. This has
in turn led to the paradoxical universalization of a service that is
not used (Arik, 2013).
Cairo is similar to Istanbul, but the network's implementation is
less developed. In 2006, roughly 1.5 million households were
equipped; the program launched that same year aimed to increase
this number to 2 million, which would represent about 55% of
households.5 Two factors have dissuaded users from getting
connected: ﬁrst, its relatively high cost, and secondly, the cost
of interior equipment, despite credit opportunities. Despite
the advantages, both ﬁnancially and in terms of comfort, once
the installation is complete, many households cannot afford the
ﬁnancial burden, particularly those with low or irregular income.
Paradoxically, while these costs are no longer open to government
subsidies, the central parts of Cairo that were the ﬁrst to beneﬁt
from the gas network received government subsidies – and their
inhabitants are, for the most part, ﬁnancially quite well off.
A second factor has also hindered the development of the gas
network: safety concerns have made it impossible to connect
some of the informal districts, either due to the poor state of their
buildings or to the density and lack of space in their narrow streets
(Fig. 3). As such, the network's development has excluded some of
the poorest people and urban sectors; far from being a vector for
integration, the network has actually exacerbated existing
inequalities.
The case of Sfax is quite similar to Cairo, with one notable
difference: the gas connection program is more recent (2002) and
4 IGDAŞ¼ Istanbul Gaz Dağıtım Sanayı ve Ticaret A.Ş; UGETAM¼Uluslararası
Gaz Eğıtım Teknoloji ve Araştırma Merkezi.
5 Personal calculation based on an estimated household size in Cairo of about
4.5 and the population for the year 2010. The real advancement of the program,
given the problem it faced, remains under this level.
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has yet to meet its targets, with less than 20% of households
connected (Bolzon et al., 2013). Here too, the cost of getting
connected and of equipping homes is a dissuasive factor for many
poor households, even though the government has handed out
large subsidies since 2002 to help with the cost of getting
connected to the network. Among other things, and as in Istanbul,
many of the users connected to the network (over half) do not use
it since they have not yet equipped their homes with the necessary
interior installations, essentially due to cost. The impact of urban
morphology is however different in Sfax than in Cairo: the city is
Fig. 3. The Natural Gas Program for Cairo and the informal settlements.
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Fig. 2. The extension of the urban network of natural gas in Istanbul.
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very dispersed over a ﬂat area, with numerous low density
“garden” districts (jneïn) that do not meet the operator's proﬁt-
ability criteria for a connection. Even for those that would be
eligible, the length of the copper pipes needed for the interior
installations make the scenario quite unattractive.
To varying degrees, in all three cases, the development of a
natural gas network has not resulted in the universalization of the
service despite the operators' ambitions. This is in part due to
ﬁnancial reasons. Apart from in the Tunisian case, access to the
service is indeed not subsidized, nor is the cost of the interior
installations required, which have to be paid for by households
and constitute a large share of the investment. Further, certain
morphological limitations combined with proﬁtability and safety
criteria mean that one part of the urban fabric is excluded from the
network. Given this, gas network services have not helped reduce
socio-spatial inequality and have even actually accentuated it in
Istanbul and Cairo. The transition to this new energy service is
thus incomplete. This is also due to the interplay between different
energy systems.
3.5. Urban gas networks and other energy options
The move to a new energy network has not occurred uniformly,
excluding a large portion of the population. But, unlike water or
electricity networks, which are truly essential services, the lack of
or inaccessibility to a natural gas networks can be tempered by
other systems, such as bottled gas or coal. What is striking in this
context is the interconnection and co-existence of different types
of access to energy: the modern industrial-type network coexists
with other types of energy, notably individual ones which are
sometimes informal or traditional, as well as occasionally renew-
able energy systems or energy-saving systems such as solar water
heaters (SWHs). These different types of access to energy may be
complementary or competing.
Thus, as mentioned above, coal and wood, as well as LPG
cylinders are still alternatives for city dwellers who do not wish or
cannot be connected to the network in Istanbul. In Cairo and Sfax,
too, LPG cylinders are an obvious alternative for city dwellers.
Another practice also exists in Sfax: a non-negligible portion of
households (nearly 10%) has chosen to install a solar water heater,
strongly encouraged by an energy-saving program run by the
Tunisian government. These households have therefore chosen not
to install gas, which is really only advantageous for users with
central heating (thus requiring greater interior investment). Para-
doxically, both programs were designed to save energy but have
proven to be competitors and stiﬂe each other. This contradiction
does not appear to have been detected by Tunisian authorities,
perhaps because it is an issue only in Sfax where gas was
implemented later and where SWHs were adopted earlier than
elsewhere (Bolzon et al., 2013).
In any case, city dwellers in all three cases weigh the pros and
cons between energy that is more comfortable to use and some-
times less expensive to consume, and access costs that conversely
can be quite discouraging. These services can be both comple-
mentary (city-dwellers in districts not supplied by gas can buy LPG
cylinders or use coal) or competing, when city-dwellers make
decisions based on the cost of coal or LPG versus networked gas. In
making such decisions, most city-dwellers show they are not
locked-in to a given energy system. Most use is still quite basic –
the complex household appliances that could reshape domestic
life remain rare – and it has not stopped people from going back
and forth between different domestic energy options: most are
poor households which are not well equipped and which have not
(yet?) reorganized their living space around a single energy
option. In this sense, we are still very much in the period of
network infancy described by Dominique Lorrain (Lorrain, 2001)
despite the (albeit unequal) progress made in the universalization
of gas network services. In other words, the systems related to the
different energy transitions simultaneously underway are not yet
sufﬁciently “embedded” to create a path dependency effect.
3.6. Transition politics of networked gas
The development of gas networks in the three cities has
become a political issue that had overﬂowed beyond the institu-
tional political sphere to settle onto the streets through demon-
strations, protests and the advocating of practices that contradict
or circumvent network development.
In Istanbul, the rise of gas price has regularly sparked demon-
strations of discontent, nevertheless unable to reverse such
decisions. Other forms of politicization are more subtle. During
election campaigns, local representatives of the Islamist party and
the associations connected to the party's charity activities
distribute free coal to poor people. Thus, in the name of electoral
populism, the local practices of party representatives go against
national and municipal policies to promote energy transition
towards gas. These practices then conﬁrm citizens in their reti-
cence towards gas and help explain why they prefer not to use this
fuel or equip their homes even when gas is readily available (Arik,
2013).
In Cairo, the research highlighted the role of recurring
shortages of LPG cylinders, notably in winter, which have fueled
very strong demands – before and after the fall of Mubarak.
Protesters are particularly critical of the fact that these shortages
cause price increases and work to the advantage of a maﬁa
thriving in the shadows of both the former regime and in its
aftermath. Discontent is also fueled by the fact that part of Egypt's
natural gas is exported, notably to Israel (and also to Jordan). It was
revealed that the export contract bore the trace of corruption in
favor of someone with close ties to Mubarak.6 Given this, pro-
testers became critical of the non-availability of natural gas for
Egyptians – in a context in which many, particularly the poorest,
cannot afford it (not to mention the technical limitations). Com-
bined with recent problems in the distribution of electricity, these
shortages have fueled dissatisfaction towards the Muslim Brother-
hood and were one reason behind the ousting of President Morsi
in July 2013. Further, several observers have noted that one of the
ﬁrst measures taken by the military government was to improve
the power supply – fueling suspicions that the network's dete-
rioration was, in part, ﬁctitious.7
Energy issues have also been politicized in Tunisia, particularly
because of price hikes in electricity and gas (which are managed
by the same company). While STEG policy from 2005 to 2010
tended to become cost-reﬂective in order to reduce the amount of
energy subsidies, the post-revolutionary governments have been
careful not to pursue this policy or at least be very cautious (with a
ﬁrst, small increase in September 2012, followed by another in the
spring of 2013) (Bennasr and Verdeil, 2014). The issue of LPG has
also been politicized: in December 2011, an extreme cold snap led
to problems with the distribution of LPG, particularly in the
mountain regions. Given this, some consumers decided to turn
to the gas network in Sfax and other equipped cities. This crisis
especially underscored the dependence on LPG. Aside from the
bad weather, one reason for the supply problem was due to sit-ins
barring access to factories by unemployed people demanding jobs
6 “Egypt jail terms over Israel deal”, in BBC News, June 28 2012 〈http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18623625〉.
7 Hubbard, Ben, Kirkpatrick, David D., 2013. “Sudden Improvements in Egypt
Suggest a Campaign to Undermine Morsi”. The New York Times, July 10, sect. World/
Middle East. 〈http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/world/middleeast/improve
ments-in-egypt-suggest-a-campaign-that-undermined-morsi.html〉.
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in the government-run LPG bottling facilities.8 Hence, this energy
is not only very costly for the government; it is also a source of
public sector jobs which may further increase the cost of subsidies.
At the same time, the crisis and dependency on LPG underscore
how difﬁcult it would be to raise the price of this energy despite
the fact that it would be a good way for the government to
encourage the transition to a gas network. Indeed, since the
countryside and numerous municipalities do not for the time
being have access to the gas network, any increase in the price of
bottled fuel would be seen as a betrayal (and increasing the price
solely in cities would simply lead to black market trafﬁcking).
The way these energy issues have been politicized actually
underscores the connections between one type of energy and the
others available on the market, revealing that it is not possible to
isolate one energy policy from the rest since each one is shaped by
the others. The (at times violent) demonstrations they generate
are a sensitive issue for the regimes, illustrating the power of
urban crowds, both electorally and in the occupation of public
space, as the Arab Spring mobilizations have demonstrated
(Verdeil, 2014b). Hence, this pressure has pushed governments
to maintain the subsidies that they claim elsewhere to want to
reduce, thus hindering ofﬁcially promoted energy transitions.
It is obvious that the way these transitions are conducted does
not depend solely on the right dose of ﬁnancial incentive (sub-
sidies, regulatory incentives, etc.), but also on a political ferment
that is very sensitive to the energy used, its cost and availability.
Essential to urban life, energy can become a right for which
citizens are prepared to ﬁght.
4. Discussion
The results exposed in the previous section are presented
according to issues that derive from a so-to-say sequential
description of natural gas projects implementation. This presents
the shortcoming of hiding dynamics and links existing between
these several layers of the analysis. For instance it does not
acknowledge the interplay of elite-driven decision-making regard-
ing the energy transition and adaptations and transformations of
such policies because of their perception and appropriation by the
citizens. This presentation also obscures the co-constitution of
energy transition policies and the territorial formation (both in
political and material terms). We discuss these issues now.
Let us start with the fact that the switch to natural gas
currently reveals a weak concern, if any, for social cohesion and
energy justice. However, the emergence of an energy urban issue
on the street has led to deep transformations of energy transition
governance and results in changes of the scope and design of these
policies. This is why energy transition governance cannot be
understood as elite-led.
At a ﬁrst glance, this popular politics might appear as more
reactive to the energy transition policy than formative. This is
especially the case with protests against price hikes. The govern-
ment fear of the popular anger can be a major curb against energy
transition if, for instance, government renounce to tariff increases
intended to push customers toward new energy services. In this
perspective, the people resist the energy transition and can stall or
even derail it.
But other characteristics of popular mobilizations about energy
issues have transformed the energy agenda. Many protests, speci-
ﬁcally in Cairo and Istanbul, have targeted power cuts, shortages of
gas bottle or the absence of modern energy service in certain
neighborhoods. For them, the right to the city includes a right to
electricity as a fuel of urban life (Verdeil, 2014a, 2014b). In so
doing, they take seriously the promise that energy transition is not
only a change in the mix but also an increased access to modern
energy, at cheaper energy unit price, making modern practices
possible (improved heating, hot water for instance). The shortages
and the bypassing of some neighborhoods by the gas network
result in unequal access, which is felt as injustice, as clearly visible
in the following quote from a young Cairene, without access to the
gas network, complaining that his aunt, who enjoyed access to the
gas network, spent less than four times what he spent on gas: “it is
her luxury of washing the dishes with hot water and stay longer
under a hot shower” (interview, march 2011).
Energy justice is then becoming a new claim induced by energy
transition. This resulted in transforming the political agenda and
the policy tools. The justiﬁcation of the donors and government
now integrate this concern for affordability (price and connection
cost), as highlighted in this recent communiqué presenting the
next stage of the World Bank funded project of gas in Egypt:
“The project will provide ﬁnancial support to ﬁnance the connec-
tion charges in disadvantaged areas so that poor households can
also connect to the gas grid”, said Husam Mohamed Beides, the
project's Task Team Leader (World Bank, 24/5/2014). This high-
lights the dynamic interplay of top-down measures and the
people's appropriation of some of the goals of this policy.
The introduction of new policy tools, aiming at subsidizing not
the gas per se but the connection cost, cannot be separated from
the context of strong protests against the energy policy of the
Egyptian government, as many newspapers articles have recently
reported.9 In this respect, it underscores two points about the
construction and the broadening of an agenda of energy justice
(Day and Walker, 2013: it is the result of a messy process, and it
assembles elements of very different kinds, like a political revolu-
tion in Egypt, economic and ﬁnancial mechanisms and the build-
ing of new mains in Egyptian cities.
The last point in this discussion underscores the links between
the existing territorial formation, both in political and material
terms, and the implementation and adjustments of the energy
transition policy. In the above examples, we showed that the
existing urban morphology of the city in Cairo or Sfax, curbed the
universalization of gas networks. In Istanbul, practices of supply-
ing free coal to citizens with the goal of securing votes for the
incumbent municipality also contradict this policy. The territorial
formation then slows or impedes the energy transition. Never-
theless, even partially implemented, this policy also has increased
social gaps inside the metropolitan spaces, between places and
people than have access and those who have not. These paradox-
ical trends highlight the mutually constitutive process of the
material, social and geographical dimensions of the urban space
and energy transition policies.
5. Conclusion and policy implications
The examination of the policy of switching to natural gas in
Istanbul Cairo and Sfax brings several lessons about energy
governance.
Firstly, the three cases analyzed indicate a trend that, in
contrast to low carbon technologies, has been under researched
in most current research into urban energy transitions, speciﬁcally
in emerging cities: the development of natural gas networks in
cities. It is quite likely that similar policies can be identiﬁed in
8 Tunisie: les bouteilles de gaz n’arrivent pas aux régions du sud », in Espace
Manager.com, November 25, 2011 〈http://www.espacemanager.com/divers/tunisie-
les-bouteilles-de-gaz-n-arrivent-pas-aux-regions-du-sud.html〉.
9 For instance: “President Sisi urges support for government in face of electricity
crisis”. Egypt Independent. September 7th, 2014. Available at: 〈http://www.egyptinde
pendent.com//news/president-sisi-urges-support-government-face-electricity-crisis〉.
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many other cities, particularly in places with natural gas resources:
e.g., Algeria or Bolivia. Such policies deserve further attention from
researchers not only because their results signiﬁcantly transform
the concerned cities and energy practices. They also impact the
way we conceptualize energy transition and the way it is
governed.
Two main justiﬁcations for implementing natural gas energy
transition have been identiﬁed, with diverging territorial and
governance implications:
 the ﬁrst was the ﬁght against air pollution, which took place in
a wider metropolitan strategy of physical modernization, thus
emphasizing the leading role of metropolitan authorities
(Istanbul);
 the second aimed at cutting state expenditures by promoting
locally available and less or not at all subsidized energy.
Inspired by macro-political concerns, with little consideration
for metropolitan issues, such a policy is led by the state and the
utilities it controls.
In both cases, the lack of concern for climate change and
greenhouse gas emissions is very clear. This contrasts with the
ordinary presentation of low carbon energy transition where such
goal is a major and prime objective. As a consequence, it involves
that donors, international climate agencies and governments
wishing to encourage energy transition in developing and emer-
ging megacities also strongly focus on economic and metropolitan
arguments in order to enroll more cities into energy transition
schemes. This is currently not highlighted enough (for instance:
OECD (2010), UN Habitat (2011)).
Concerns for energy justice, as revealed in the three case
studies, have major consequences for governance. We do not only
speak of the governance of the energy system but, as protests
related to energy services observed before and more strongly since
the Arab Spring have shown, of national stability itself. Access to
modern energy forms has become a major stake, one that requires
several policy moves:
 Utilities and their political authorities (metropolitan and
national governments) must carefully design policy tools to
ﬁt the material constraints of popular housing and neighbor-
hoods, and their ﬁnancial possibilities. This involves classical
safety nets and social tariffs but also incentives adapted to
speciﬁc urban morphology.
 It is clear that such measures cannot by themselves remove all
barriers. The universalization of energy transition programs,
combining energy and environmental efﬁciency, social sustain-
ability and access involves mixing energy sources and technol-
ogies. Therefore it is necessary to establish governance schemes
that go beyond mono-energy approach (e.g. natural gas net-
works, solar water heaters, photovoltaic panels, insulation, as
well as the more traditional LPG). We believe our geographical
approach has particularly underscored that various energy
forms already and will coexist together for long. The stake is
to articulate them and to coordinate their promotion, in the
metropolitan space as well as economically, to avoid competi-
tion and to ensure complementarity. In this respect, we suggest
that much could be learned from the policy of universalizing
water in poor metropolis, thanks to a diverse and gradual
basket of instruments adapted to various publics and spaces,
and through recognizing the existence of composite systems
(Jaglin, 2013).
The issue of scale in energy governance is a last point this
article has addressed. The case of Istanbul demonstrates the
efﬁciency of an energy governance scheme led by a metropolitan
actor, since energy measures are integrated and coordinated with
many other aiming at modernizing the city, from physical planning
to transportation – and this is not to say that everything works
perfectly in this city. But the case of Istanbul might seem difﬁcult
to emulate because political and administrative organizations are
speciﬁc to every city and country. However, it seems that in
Tunisian cities and speciﬁcally in Sfax, as well as in Cairo (and
other Egyptian cities), the national and regional utilities have to
better take into consideration local issues and speciﬁcities while
designing energy transition schemes. This seems difﬁcult to
achieve without local participation, decentralization and a demo-
cratic endeavor.
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